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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL,
Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 18120

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, and CAROL
PETERSEN,
Appel lees.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant
to Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial
review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, which reversed the decision of an Appeal Referee which denied benefits
to the Appellee, Carol Petersen, effective July 5, 1981, pursuant to Section
35-4-S(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979),
on the grounds that while said Appellee may not have had good cause for voluntarily leaving work, a denial of benefits in the instant case would be
contrary to equity and good conscience.
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DISPOSITION BELOW
Appellee, Carol Petersen (hereinafter referred to as Claimant), was
denied unemployment benefits effective July 5, 1981 by a Department Representative pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979), hereinafter
referred to as the Act, on the grounds she voluntarily left work without good
cause.

(R.0037)

The claimant appealed to an Appeal Referee, who affirmed

the decision to deny benefits by a decision dated September 16, 1981.
Board of Review reversed the decision of the Appeal Referee

by

The

a decision

issued November 12, 1981, in Case No. 81-A-3224-R, 81-BR-324, on the ground
that although claimant did not have good cause to quit, it would be contrary
to equity and good conscience to deny her benefits.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Board of Review's decision allowing
the award of unemployment benefits.

Appellees seek affirmance of the deci-

sion by the Board of Review (hereinafter referred to as Appellee).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee substantially agrees with the Statement of Facts set forth in
Appellant's Brief, except in the following particulars, to wit:

2
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At page 5 of its Brief, Appellant states:
Petersen told Featherston that her supervisor kept informing her that she was not producing, was not doing
her job, and always spoke with her at inappropriate
times. {Emphasis added.)
Appellant does not indicate where in the record claimant made such statements
to Featherston.

Appellant apparently is referring to claimant's testimony at

the bottom of R.0021 where, in response to the Appeal Referee's question of
what circumstances caused claimant to go to Featherston, claimant described
her supervisor's actions of cri ti ci zing claimant s performance "just before
1

I was to be with a group of ori en tees. 11
"extremely painful

11

Claimant went on to describe how

and upsetting this was to her and how it appeared to her

that her supervisor was deliberately choosing a bad time to criticize her.
While claimant well may have told this to Featherston, the record indicates
only that she was relating to the Appea 1 Referee the circumstances which
caused her to go to him.
Claimant's testimony that the work environment made her ill; that as a
nurse she knew the consequences of prolonged stress; what she could take;
what she could not take; and, therefore, that she hadn't consulted a doctor
is at R.0022 and not R.23 as stated on page 6 of Appellant's Brief.
While it is true that Mr. Featherston testified that claimant never
utilized the formal grievance procedure as indicated at page 9 of Appellant's
Brief, Mr. Featherston also testified that he is the third-level supervisor
to whom an appeal would be addressed in the grievance process {R.0028), that
claimant did come to him with her problems with her supervisor {R.0026), and

3
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that he did not discuss the formal grievance procedure with her

11
•

•

•

because • • • I di dn 1 t see it as appropriate when we were discussing the
matter.

11
(

R. 0028)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well estab1i shed.

Sec ti on 35-4-1 O( i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part:
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the
facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and
the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law.

This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Conwnission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be
disturbed.

Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).

In analyzing the above-referenced review provision, this Court has stated:
Under Section 35-4-lO(i) the role of this Court is to
sustain the determination of the Board of Review unless
the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of
the Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law, the determination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion
could be drawn from the facts. Continental Oil Company
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
(Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729.

4
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POINT II
SECTION 35-4-S(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS
INTENDED TO DISQUALIFY FROM THE RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED BY REASON OF
THEIR OWN FAULT.
Section 35-4-S(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Pocket Supplement, 1979)
provides:
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for
purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the commission,
and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for such services equal to at least six times
the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provided, that no
claimant shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant
leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose
a disqualification.
The commission shall in cooperation with the employer
consider for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness
of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the
actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the
labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and
good conscience.
This Court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist a worker and his family in times when he is out of work
without fault on his part.

Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Depart-

ment of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); and that the
Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation by adhering to the volitional test.

Olaf Nelson Construction Company

v• The I ndust r i a1 Comm i s s i on , 121 U• 521 , 243 P• 2d 951 (1952) ; Mi 11 s v•
Gronning, (Utah, 1978) 581 P. 2d 1334.
5
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POINT III
THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT BEING REMEDIAL IN CHARACTER
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AND ADMINISTERED TO EFFECTUATE
ITS PURPOSES BUT DISQUALIFICATION OR FORFEITURE PROVISIONS
SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.
This Court has heretofore held that the Employment Security Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, being remedial in character, should be libera1ly construed and administered to effectuate its purposes, which include
lightening the burdens of unemployment and maintaining purchasing power in
the economy.

Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 U. 175,

134 P. 2d 479, 485 (1943); Northern Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 U.
353, 140 P. 2d 329, 332 (1943); Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 7 U. 2d 113, 320 P. 2d 315, 318 (1958).
On the other hand, in construing Section 5(b)(l) of the Act in Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah,

Supra,

at p. 730, this Court relied upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941)
for the principle that:
.•• [A] statute for a forfeiture should be strictly
construed, and an ambiguous or doubtful term should be
given a construction which is least likely to work a
forfeiture. The penal character of the provision should
be mininized by excluding, rather than including, conduct not clearly intended to be within the provision.
While the Continental Oil Co. case dealt with Section 5(b)(l) rather than
Section 5(a) of the Act, the above reasoning is applicable to this case in
that both provide for a forfeiture if certain facts exist.

6
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POINT IV
THE BOARD OF REVIEW PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE EQUITY AND GOOD
CONSCIENCE EXCEPTION TO THE VOLUNTARY QUIT DISQUALIFICATION
CONTAINED IN SECTION 35-4-S(a) OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
The Appellant contends that the Board of Review erred in its interpretation of the "equity and good conscience" provision of Section S(a) of the
Act.

Appellant contends at page 18 of its Brief that:
The interpretation given by the Board of Review would
make the "good cause" language in the statute meaning1ess.

Further, Appellant contends, at page 20-21 of its Brief that:
It would not be reasonable for a person to leave their
employment merely because they have been criticized on
several occasions by their supervisor regardless of when
these occasions occurred. Likewise, it would not be
reasonable for a person to leave their employment when
they are denied a transfer due to the employer's policy
of preventing conflicts between best friends in a subordinate and superior position. The Board would have
concluded that these factors were not sufficient to
justify the voluntary termination under the "good cause"
mandate.
It is important to note the actual decision of the Board of Review.

The

Board held that although the claimant did not have good cause for voluntarily leaving work, a denial of benefits would be contrary to equity and good
conscience within the intent and purposes of the Employment Security Act.
(R.0006)

The basis for the Board's decision was:
••• the claimant's testimony that on several occasions
she was criticized by her supervisor just before conducting training sessions and that she was denied a transfer
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to another assignment for which she was experienced solely because the supervisor of the new unit would have been
a friend of the claimant's. The claimant's testimony
regarding these circumstances was undisputed by the employer's representative.
In order to determine whether the decision of the Board of Review is
supported by

substantial,

competent evidence, it is

first necessary to

understand the legal basis of the decision.
The hi story of the 1979 amendments to the Employment Security Act,
Senate Bill 78, illuminates the intent of the Legislature in providing an
"equity and good conscience" exception to the voluntary quit disqualificati on.
Prior to July 1, 1979, Section 5(a) of the Employment Security Act, provided that a claimant who voluntarily quit work shall be disqualified for six
weeks.

If the commission found mitigating circumstances to exist, the com-

mission could assess a disqualification of less than six weeks.

At the con-

clusion of the disqualification period, whether it was for six weeks or less,
a claimant could re-file for and receive unemployment benefits.

For many

years the management representatives on the Employment Security Advisory
Council had sought to change the six week disqualification to an indefinite
disqualification which could be purged only by returning to work for a period
of time and then becoming unemployed through no fault of the claimant.

Their

concern undoubtedly was centered on the payment of benefits to ; ndi vi dua 1s,
such as secondary wage earners who were not genuinely attached to the labor
market, but rather worked only enough to qualify for benefits, accepted the
six week disqualification, and then proceeded to draw benefits until they had

8
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exhausted their cl aims.
Auditor General.

This was subsequently expressed by the Legi sl ati ve

(See A Performance Audit of the Unemployment Insurance Pro-

Gram in Utah, May 1978, Report to the Utah State Legi sl atu re, No. 78-9,
pages 6-9.)

The labor representatives to the Advisory Council, of course,

resisted such efforts because of their concern for those claimants who may
not have been compelled to quit, but quit under mitigating circumstances sufficient to result in less than the ful1 disqualification.

For an excellent

discussion of the role and history of the Utah Employment Security Council,
see Shared Government in Employment Security, by

S. J. Becker, Columbia Uni-

versity Press (1959), Chapter 5, pp. 155-142, (available at the BYU Harold
B. Lee Library or the Department of Employment Security Library).

See also

Minutes of the Advisory Council Meetings for 1978, available at the Department of Employment Security Administrative Office, 174 Social Hall Avenue,
Salt Lake City.

A portion of the Minutes of the Advisory Council Subcommit-

tee are also attached hereto as Appendice.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Legislative Auditor General 1 s Staff conducted a performance audit of the unemployment insurance program during 1978.

Recognizing the role of the Advisory Council, which was

established pursuant to Section 35-4-ll(e),

U.C.A. 1953, the Legislative

Auditor's Staff met with an Advisory Council Subcommittee on June 8, 1978,
and presented the results of their audit, recommending certain changes in
the Employment Security Act.
dix I, herein.

See Minutes of the Subcommittee Meeting, Appen-

In response to the expressed concerns of the Legi sl ati ve

9
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Audi tor General and others, the Advisory Council met several times thereafter, culminating in the drafting of a bill to amend the Employment Security
Act which was subsequently submitted to the 1979 Legi sl atu re and became designed as Senate Bill 78.

Senate Bil 1 78 was the result of substantial

negotiations between the 1abor and employer representatives on the Advisory
Counci 1 Subcommittee.

The concerns of 1abor and employer representatives

with respect to voluntary quit, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
were resolved with a compromise proposal for an indefinite disqualification
unless a denial of benefits would be contrary to equity and good conscience.
The Advisory Council requested that the Department of Employment Security
prepare a memorandum explaining how the equity and good conscience exception
to the disqualification should be applied.

A memorandum was issued on Octo-

ber 13, 1978 and officially adopted by the Advisory Council Subconunittee on
October 18, 1978.

See Appendi ce I I and I I I.

It is interesting to note in

this regard that the mo ti on to adopt the memorandum was made by one of the
labor representatives and seconded by the employer representative.
Advisory Council Letterhead, Appendix IV.

See

tJote also that in its report to

the Legislature the Advisory Council explained the effort that went into the
development of Senate Bill 78 as follows:
The attached Senate Bill 78 is the result of nearly a
year of meetings which included the study of the laws
of other states and the Legislative Auditor's report,
open hearings where special interest groups could express their concerns and, finally, a great deal of negotiation primarily between the employer and employee
representatives over what changes to make and the wording of those changes.

10
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Appell ant argues at page 20 of its Brief that the term "reasonable" as
used in defining equity and good conscience in Section 5(a) must have the
same meaning as used in judicial definitions of "good cause" for quitting
work.

However, as can be seen from Appendix II herein, the Advisory Council

had negotiated an exception to the good cause requirement that would all ow
benefits when mitigating circumstances exist.

If the term "reasonable" must

be applied under the equity and good conscience provision only with the same
meaning as that term is used for the "good cause" standard, then obviously
there would have been no need for the exception which was negotiated by the
labor and management representatives on the Advisory Council.
In addition, floor debate on the Senate confirms the intent of the
members of the Advisory Council and the acceptance of that intent by the Legislature.

During the third reading of Senate Bill 78, Senator Halverson

proposed an amendment to the bi 11, which raised an objection from the bi 11
sponsor, Senator Black.

Senator Black moved that the Senate be formed into

a Committee of the Whole in order to question a representative of the Department of Employment Security concerning the intent of the Advisory Counci 1.
Mr. Floyd Astin, General Counsel for the Utah Department of Employment Securi ty, testified as to the reason for having an equity and good conscience
provision in the following manner:
••• good cause, the courts have generally ruled this,
this is language in all, most jurisdictions. Generally
they rule that good cause is what· a reasonable prudent
person would do. There is a lot of language, but it
boils down basically to that. And there are areas, however, they're in that gray land that it is hard to say
its this; its not good cause, but he had some good reasons for what he did. And this is what this language is
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trying to get at. (Refer to 1979 Legislative Session,
Senate Journal, page 340, and recording of the afternoon
session of day 22.)
Contrary to Appel 1ant 1 s contention that the equity and good conscience
provision of the Act is an unlimited standard, the Legi sl atu re structured
the discretion the commission may exercise in cases such as this.

In making

decisions under Section 5(a) of the Act, the commission must look to the purposes of the Act which are (1) to assist the worker and his family in times
when, without fault on his part, he is out of work and (2) to provide stability for the economy by assuring continuity of purchasing power.
Industrial Commission, 121 U. 551,

243 P. 2d 964 (1952);

Lexes v.

Kennecott Copper

Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, Supra; Johnson v.
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, Supra.

It

is apparent

from

the fact that the Legislature did not eliminate the "at fault" concept in unemployment cases, that the Legislature must have intended a melding or blending of the fault concept with the purpose of maintaining purchasing power in
the community when an individual becomes unemployed by reason of a voluntary
quit, but under mitigating circumstances.

For that reason, the commission is

required to also look at the reasonableness of the claimant's actions under
the circumstances and whether or not the claimant's actions contain evidence
of a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market.
At page 14 of its Brief, Appe 11 ant cites Boodry v. Eddy Bakeries Co.,
397 P. 2d 256 (Idaho 1964), as a similar case to the instant one which "held
that 'good cause'

is not established when a superintendent criticizes a

worker for substandard work."
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In Boodry, the claimant tried, in part, to justify her voluntary quit on
the ground that the superintendent threatened her as follows:
Well, Jack Hall, every time you didn't do anything he
wanted you to do just exactly, he always comes up with
this little statement like, "You're not indispensable",
and that's just like a threat saying if you don't do
such-and-such, we're going to get rid of you.
Appellee submits that "threat" is distinguishable from the present case
where the supervisor, knowing it was inappropriate timing, criticized claimant 1 s performance just before claimant was to teach cl asses and thus sabotaged her effectiveness to the point that claimant was made physically ill.
Beaman v. Aynes, 393 P. 2d 152 (Ariz. 1964), cited by Appellant at page
14 of its Brief, as precedent that "good cause" is not established "when an
employee fails to follow grievance procedures as to disputes in the condition
of employment" is also distinguishable from the present case.

In Beaman the

claimant quit when the employer refused to pay $8.16 of additional pay the
claimant claimed was due under the collective bargaining agreement.

Subse-

quent to quitting the claimant submitted his grievance through the union and
was paid his additional $8.16.

In the instant case the claimant had no union

to turn to and even though she failed to utilize the formal grievance procedure, the Director of her supervisor to whom she did complain didn't see the
formal grievance procedure as appropriate when they were discussing the matter.

(R.0028)

Appellant submits claimant demonstrated an effort to work

out her grievances to a point where further efforts would be futile.
Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P. 2d 626, 627 (Utah, 1977).
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See

The Appellant acknowledges at page 15 of its Brief that it was unable
to find "any similar wording of a statute in the United States in which
'equity and good conscience' applies to qualifications of unemployment benefits."

Appellee is similarly unaware of any such wording of a statute in any

other state.

Thus the decisions from other states can shed little if any

1i ght on the proper interpretation of Utah s "equity and good conscience"
1

provision.
In reference to Appell ant s cri ti ci sm of the phrase "equity and good
1

con sci ence 11 at pages 15-16 of its Brief, it should be noted that it was in a
dissenting opinion in City of Leadville v. Leadville Sewer Co., 107 P. 801,
813 (Colo. 1909), wherein

11

Equity and good con sci ence 11 was termed an "elastic

expression."
Appellee submits that Gilles v. Dept. of Human Resources Development,
521 P. 2d 110, 116 (Cal. 1974), cited at page 16 of Appellant's Brief is
favorable authority for affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review in
this case.

Respecting "equity and good conscience" the court in Gilles

stated at page 116:
[2] Section 1375, however, says nothing of notice, but
enunciates a standard of "equity and good conscience"-1anguage of unusual generality. Such broad terms necessarily anticipate that the trier of fact, instead of
attempting to channelize his decision within regid and
specific rules, will draw upon precepts of justice and
morality as the basis for his ruling.10 Thus the language of section 1375 impliedly rejects the notion that
the board can establish a rule which focuses decision
upon a single narrow issue such as notice; it involves
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a panoramic vision that encompasses all factors which
might persuade an individual--or a government--of good
conscience to forego recoupment of moneys previously
paid.
The definition of "conscience" which Appellant refers to on page 17 of its
Brief comes from an 1857 case cited in footnote 10 noted above.
Appell ee submits that the intent of the Utah Legi sl atu re in amending
Section 35-4-5(a) of the Act to provide an "equity and good conscience"
exception to the disqualification for quitting a job without good cause is
better determined from the l egi sl ati ve hi story cited above by Appe 11 ee than
by cases from other juri sdi cti ans which are construing dissimilar statutes.
The factual circumstances surrounding the claimant's decision to voluntarily leave her work, as found by the Board of Review, and the evidence in
support of those findings, will be fully discussed in Point V hereof.

How-

ever, having found that on several occasions claimant was criticized by her
supervisor just before conducting training sessions and that she was denied
a transfer to another assignment for which she was experienced solely because
the supervisor of the new unit would have been a friend of the claimant's,
the Board properly concluded that mitigating circumstances existed at the
time of the claimant's quit.

This conclusion is further supported by the

claimant's testimony that the work environment made her ill (R.0022) and by
her demonstrated continuing attachment to the labor market shown by her parttime work at Hill Air Force Base subsequent to her quitting her job with
Appellant.

(R.0019-20)
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POINT V
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT A DENIAL OF
BENEFITS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT EXCEPTION TO THE VOLUNTARY QUIT DISQUALIFICATION.
Appellee submits that the record in this case provides substantial competent evidence that justify Appellee's decision that a denial of benefits
would be contrary to equity and good conscience.
When asked by the Appeals Referee, "Did you quit your job?

11

claimant

responded:
Uh, I, no, I didn't mean to quit it. I wanted to take a
leave of absence because I was--1 feel like I was being
really, really harrassed. [sic] I couldn't take it. I
was physically ill. I just, I just come to the end of
my rope and I just simply couldn't take the harrassment
[sic] from my immediate supervisor and-She explained she went to see the Director, Mr. Joe Featherston, who is over
her supervisor.

When the Appeal Referee asked the circumstances which caused

claimant to see Mr. Featherston, the claimant testified:
Well, the main, the well, it--There were just a lot of
little snide remarks that she would make that really
bothered me and then one day she (it was just before I
was to be with a group of orientees--there were about
seven or eight of them so it must have been the first
part of May} and she just jumped all over me and that I
wasn't producing and I wasn't doing my job and I was
cheating the hospital. And it was really extremely
painful, and I was, I was just shaking by the time I had
to, you know, talk to these people. And I was just
shaking and I couldn't keep my mind on it. This happened at three different intervals.
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The Appeal Referee then asked, "About when was the first time that that happened?"

And the claimant responded:
I think, and I, I tend to block because it's so painful,
but I think--this is about the first time that I really
remember it,
you know, that it was--just seemed to be-11
She said, 1 know this is a bad time to be getting after
you," like, "this is the time I choose because I know
it's a bad time. 11 And that was about the first of May
and then there was--1 can't remember when I first came
to see you, Joe, but it was right after another episode.
And then she did it again just before I had a diabetic
coming, you know, to teach. And I just re-I can't remember the date on that, but I can remember how upset I was
and trying to get, you know, my mind set over to helping
this diabetic and how difficult it was. (R.0021)

Thus Appellant's contention at page 14 of its Brief that:
The Board of Review in this case recognized that the
claim by Carol Petersen of harrassment [sic] by her
supervisor was not substantiated by the facts •••
is simply not true.

The Board's decision, based as it is on the above-cited

testimony, clearly recognized claimant was being harassed.
Claimant finally decided:
I don't understand it. I can't take it.
have some help somewhere.

I've got to

At that point claimant went to see Mr. Featherston.

The testimony con-

cerning her visit and its purpose was in part:
PETERSEN:
I just told him--! said, "I guess you know things aren't
going well," and he said, "Yeah, I can see there's some
bad chemistry down there." And so, anyway, I think
that's when we decided that I would take a leave of
absence, right?
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FEATHERSTON:
That was the original thing you proposed, yes.
PETERSEN:
Yeah that s what I wanted to do. I did not want to quit
St. Benedict's. I had no intentions of ever quitting. I
knew I couldn't stay in that environment because I was, I
was ill. I really was.
1

REFEREE:
Were you under a doctor's care?
PETERSEN:
No, I was just, you know how you get upset and diarrhea
and al 1 that good stuff. • • •
REFEREE:
So on the--The decision to take time off was your decision, not necessarily advice of a doctor?
PETERSEN:
No, that, that--Well, I'm a nurse, you know, I know what
I can take and what I can't and what the consequences of
prolonged stress are. (R.0022)
Thus when claimant went to Mr. Featherston, she did not intent to quit
even though the stress had made her i 11.

She merely wanted a leave of ab-

sence in order to get her self-esteem back together."
11

(R.0023)

This Court noted in Box Elder County v. Industrial Conwnission of Utah,
Unemployment Compensation Appeals Board and Ellis V. Flint, 632 P.

2d 839,

841 (1981), that a claimant "need not necessarily prove that he was advised
by his physician to quit his job.

11
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Claimant recognized that even after a leave of absence she would not
want to come back under her present supervisor.

Also, her position couldn't

remain vacant while she was on leave.

Therefore, she went to see

Pat Brown, the Director of Nurses.

(R.0023)

She requested a transfer to the Coronary

Care Unit where she has 10 years of training.

She was told she could not

work in Coronary Care and that she could not take a 1eave of absence.

She

was offered a night shift as a staff nurse in an area she wasn't familiar
with.

(R.0023-24 &0026)
It is difficult to determine from the minimal

evidence offered by

either the claimant (R.0023 and 0024) or the employer (R.0026) whether the
offered night shift work could be considered suitable.

However, the fact

that it was in an area with which claimant was unfamiliar would indicate that
the work was unsuitable in that it failed to utilize her "skills, training
and experience,

11

and she was denied a 1eave of absence which would have

provided her an opportunity to seek other suitable work.

See United States

Steel Corp. v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 523 P. 2d 854 (1974).
Mr. Featherston testified that the Director of Nursing did not have
authority to deny claimant a leave of absence but it appears that claimant
did not know this.
Mr. Featherston also testified that the reason claimant's request to
transfer to the Coronary Care Unit, "where she does have expertise,
denied was because "her best friend is the head nurse of that unit.

11

was

We do

not feel that that would be a healthy relationship for either of them.

It

would put undue pressure on the head nurse for that type of relationship and
it wouldn't be healthy for Carol either."

(R.0026)
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There is no indication that this reason was explained to claimant but
even if it had, it undoubtedly simply reinforced her feeling that she was
being "railroaded right out. 11

(R.0024)

Claimant demonstrated her attach-

ment not only to the labor market but also to this particular employer by
her request of a transfer from the unit in which she was experiencing difficulty with her supervisor to a unit in which the employer acknowledges her
expertise.

The decision of the Baord of Review recognizes this request by

the claimant as a reasonable alternative which the employer could have accepted.

The Board of Review was not persuaded by the employer's explanation

for denying claimant the transfer.

It seems rather illogical for a hospital

to deny an employee a transfer from a unit where her relationship with her
supervisor was so bad it made her physically ill to a unit where her supervisor was her best friend on the ground that
her.

11

it wouldn't be healthy" for

One would expect she would not only feel better, but would function

more effectively for her employer in a congenial atmosphere.
Even when she decided she was going to quit she stated she would be
available through the end of July.
(R.0026)

This was admitted by Mr. Featherston.

It was the employer's decision that she would be allowed to work

only through the end of June.

( R.0026)

It was not the claimant who pre-

pared and submitted a letter of resignation, rather it was her supervisor
with whom she did not get along who typed up the letter of resignation
specifying claimant would leave on June 30 and demanded that claimant sign
it.

Claiment did not want to sign it but felt intimidated.

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R.0024-25.

Even after she had signed the letter of resignation she went to see
Mr. Featherston about it, indicating her surprise that she was asked to
resign at the end of

11

30 days as opposed to 60 days. 11

employer "stuck with 30 days."

(R.0027)

Nevertheless, the

See General Rules of Adjudication,

Rule 135.4 Resignation Intended, which states in pertinent part:
135.4 Resignation Intended
When a worker submits his/her resignation to be effective
at some definite future date, but is discharged prior
thereto, the leaving is usually not considered voluntary.
The reason for this is that the immediate cause of the
claimant's unemployment was the result of the employer's
action and caused the worker to suffer a wage loss for
period the employer did not permit him to work. The reason for discharge should be examined to see whether a
denial under Section 5(b)(l) is required.
The Appeal Referee commented in his decision that the claimant chose not
to pursue the employer's formal
Mr. Featherston, admitted:

grievance procedure.

(R.0016}

However,

1) that he was the third 1evel supervisor to

whom an appeal would be addressed in the grievance process (R.0028); 2} that
claimant did come to him with her problems with her supervisor (R.0026); 3)
that he did not discuss the formal grievance procedure with claimant because
11
•••

I didn't see it as appropriate when we were discussing the matter."

(R.0028)
Under these circumstances, it does not appear that claimant should be
faulted for failing to utilize the formal grievance procedure.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in support of the decision by the Board of Review is both
competent and substantial.

The Board of Review is not bound by the findings

of the Appeal Referee even when such findings are supported by evidence.

The

decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of March, 1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON,
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

By
--co_r_i~n--R-.-a~i-a-ue-r~----~--~---
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APPENUIX I

ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
174 Social Hall Avenu~
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

DATE:

June 8, 1978

PLACE:

174 Social Hall Avenue (Executive Board Room)

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Helen Ure, Chairperson
Robert E. Halladay

Ray Walters
Ed Mayne

Department of Employment Security
Edgar M. Denny
Duane Price

Floyd G. Astin
Richard B. Weed

Others
Representative Harold Newman
Dr. Robert Parsons, Consultant from BYU
Dick Schone - AFL-CIO
Legislative Auditors
Douglas West
David Porter
Sumner Newman
Wayne Welsh
The meeting was called to order by Chairperson Ure. Lenice
Nielsen was excused. Mrs. Ure remarked that she felt that the auditors
have done a fine job. While they may not agree philosophically with
some of the positions the auditors have taken, the subcommittee agreed
that the auditors had made a number of recommendations that have merit
and that their audit appeared to have been done on a systematic, professional basis. Mrs. Ure asked Floyd Astin, General Counsel, to introduce
the speakers and the subject as he had worked most closely with the
legislative audito~s.
The legislative auditors, supervised by Mr. West "walked" through
their performance audit of the U. I. program. At the outset Mr. West
said that they would look at it as objectively as possible and that
they would like the subcommittee to view the auditors in a consulting
role. He stated that their only purpose in making the aud~t was to
look at the U.I. program and to make recommendations based upon what
their audit revealed. Any law changes that occur will come about
through the Advisory Council proposing legislation and through legislative action, not through the actions of the auditors. Representative
Newman expressed the fact that he has found out how important the Advisory Council is with respect to U.I. legislation since he has been
in the legislature. Mr. West stated that this audit has been sent to
the legislature but has not as yet been the subject of a formal review.
· · ·
~.-_ ~he audit was a random sample of 500 out of 34,500
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claimants who had applied for and received benefits between Nove~berl,
1976 and October 31, 1977. Approximately 300 of t~e 590 selecte ._
claimants were used to test the eligibility determination and moni
.
taring procedures. The auditors stated that inferences made from their
sampling process had a statistical confidence level of .95 p~rcent . .
Recommendations made by the auditors which require legislative consider
ation if they are to be adopted include:
1.

That the Utah State Legislature amend Section 3S-4:5(a) ?f
the Utah code to disqualify claimants who voluntarily quit
work without good cause for the duration of their unemployment.

2.

That Section 35-4-5(b)(l) be amended to disqualify claimants
who are discharged for misconduct for the entire period of
unemployment.

3.

That the Utah State Legislature amend Section 35-4~5(c) of
the Utah Code to disqualify claimants who fail without good
cause to properly apply, to accept referrals, to accept work,
or to return to customary self-employment for the entire
period of their unemployment. (Mr. Walters asked if this
shouldn't include the term "suitable work" and it was agreed
by the auditors that it should.)

4.

That the Utah State Legislature consider amending Section
35-4-3(b) of the Utah Code so that 100% of retirement income
is deducted from a claimant's weekly benefit amount.

5.

That the Department of Employment Security and the Advisory
Council study Utah's experience rating system to determine
ways of improving employer participation in eligibility
determination.
That the results of this study should be presented to the
Utah State Legislature for further consideration and action.

6.

That the phrase " ... and otherwise eligible for benefits ... "
be deleted from the first sentence of Section 35-4-5(c) of
the statute.

7.

That the Legislature consider adopting an active work search
provision to identify:
a.
b.
c.

8.

When the work search must begin;
Restrictions that the individual cannot place on
acceptable jobs;
Any groups that are exempt from active work search
and the period of time they are exempt.

That the Legislature review Section 35-4-S(e) of the statute
and consider:
a.

Changing the statute to require only the repayment
of benefits received due to fraud;

b.

~~q~~irft~~tI~~ ~~;I~je f;~~/:~~i;~ "~ E w~e~'.
discovered rather

than·wt·"':'""

~ . . ~.• ~.~--- ~
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Mr. Halladay brought out the fact that the General Accounting Office
has issued an audit report on a national basis.
Voluntary Qui ts
When asked by Mr. Walters if they were able to determine if any
voluntary quits were proper, Mr. West stated that it would be impossible for the auditors to identify from their sample individuals who
weren't given a disqualification for voluntary quit. "Good cause" was
discussed and Mr. Denny stated that good cause has been defined by
the courts and is not as open to interpretation as inferred by the
preceding discussion.
Mr. Mayne asked about penalization of those who voluntary reduce themselves from a job during a company reduction in force. He
was told that that reason for a voluntary quit did not appear in the
audit sample. Mr. West informed him that since it was not identified
as a cause the audit did not deal with it. Mr. Price said that such
persons were generally given a minimum two week disqualification.
Misconduct
Misconduct was discussed. The fact was brought out that in all
instances of disqualification, except for fraud, Utah's law only delays
payment. It doesn't reduce the benefit year or the total benefit eligibility. The sample indicated th.at 700 out of 35,000 were disqualified by the agency for misconduct. The auditors stated that even
though their sample was small they are 95% confident that this is a
good report.
Disqualification
When discussing disqualification, it was mentioned that a person,
when disqualified, would then probably go on welfare. It was brought
out by Mr. Halladay that this is not our problem because we are an
insurance program and are only concerned with eligibility. Chairperson
Ure remarked that welfare programs have to establish their own criteria
for eligibility and that the two programs, Welfare and Unemployment
Insurance, are independent. She also stated that the public in general
is questioning qualification and disqualification for U.I. benefits
and that their concerns should be taken into consideration by the subcommittee.
Experience Rating
Experience rating was mentioned. Mr. West stated that it is
working well in Utah and that it has real advantages. It has good,
sound management. He did say that Utah employers are not generally concerned about who receives benefits and that our experience rating
system does not give employers an incentive to be concerned.
Fraud
A newspaper article (Attachment #1) was referred to. Mr. Denny
said that it is much easier to find fraud than it is to prosecute and
.. ~
,~:,,,,~~,\;~l---~,,-7"."·~~.
~hut that prosecut'ors have a much better attitude
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s 1nce the auditors have talked to them. Prose cut: ion is easier 1..uan
collecting overpayments. Mr. Denny expressed his concern that t~~
citizenry would only take a limited amount of 1harassment: He sai
that the agency is computerizing collections, but that will only be
a partial solution to the problem.
Failure to Apply_ for Work
Approximately 3 percent or 1,000 claimants being pai~ ~enefits
during the 12 months ending October 31, 1977 were disqualified for
failure to apply for or accept suitable work.
Dr. Parsons spoke.briefly on literature involving unemployment
insurance. He presented a Biblio rah : Economics of Unem lo ment
Insurance (Attachment #2). He sai tat in is review o the literature he had attempted to look for information relating to the issues
in the audit. There is a remarkable consensus among economists in
these areas. Most feel t-he U. I. program is good but that some changes
are needed. Research has resulted in three main conclusions:
1.
2.
3.

More liberal benefits lead to higher unemployment rates.
A higher denial rate lowers unemployment.
An increase in administration expenditures to monitor claimants
who fail to apply for, or accept suitable work, will reduce
unemployment.

Monitoring specific claimants who fail to apply for or accept suitable
work is referred to as the work test. An increase in the application
of the work test will reduce unemployment. The more time unemployment
insurance office personnel spend seeking eligibility, the tighter the
screening, the lower the unemployment rate will be without discouraging
job search.
The auditors were excused with a vote of thanks.
1978.

Chairperson Ure called for approval of the minutes of May 22,
They were approved as written.

Mrs. Ure asked if it was the subcommittee's feeling that we should
go through the recommendations and decide how we want to deal with them
Mr. Halladay said that we're not restricted to the auditor's report ud
that we still have a job to do. The auditor's report is helpful, but
we do have to bring our own ideas in.
Universities and non-profit organizations were discussed since it
appears that someone at USU was responsible for U.I. legislation proposed during the special session of the legislature. Specifically
mentioned were the B.Y.U., University of Utah, and the State University.
Mr. Denny said that their average costs for unemployment compensation
are the lowest of all employers in the state because they do not contribute to the fund or to administrative costs. Mr. Halladay stated
that we should contact Representative Waldrum and get a statement from
him as he was the one who submitted the bill in the special session of
the legislature pertaining to disqualification.
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The next meeting of the subcommittee will be held the 28th of
June at 2:00 p.m. in the Executive Board Room at 174 Social Hall
Avenue. The subcommittee will discuss qualification and disqualification issues from all sources and make a decision on which ones to
agree with or disagree with.
Meeting was adjourned at 4:00 p.m.

,.,,

.' .

'Secretary
!
...

Attachments
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D~P•rtm~n t

of EmploytrNnt Scurit'I

9niao{fict Communica.fiOn

Floyd G. Astin
General Counsel

Cleared for Release:

Date: October 13, 1978

TO:

Directors, Section Heads and Local Office Managers

SUBJECT:

Recent Law Changes

Subsections 35-4-5-(a), (b) (1) and (c) of the Utah Employment
Security Act were recently changed. In order to establish unifonn application of these subsections, the following policies will apply.
There are two basic changes in subsection 35-4-S(b)(l). The
word "misconduct" has been deleted and replaced by the Utah Supreme Court
definition of that word, which is any action or omission in connection
with employment which is deliberate, wilful, or wanton and is adverse to
the employers rightful interest." This is the same definition we have
used in the past so there will not be any change in the application of the
section. The word misconduct was deleted because of the negative connotations associated w·ith the word. It should, therefore, also be deleted
from all our decisions.
11

11

11

The second change in 35-4-S(b)(l) is in the duration of the dis- ·
qualification. Instead of 2 to 10 weeks, it will provide a disqualification requiri\ng the claimant to reenter employment and earn at least 6
times the cla1mant's weekly benefit amount.
Subsections 35-4-S(a) and (c) have similar changes. They each
have the change in duration of the disqualification from the fonner 2 to
6 weeks to the disqualification that now requires the claimant to return
to work and earn at least 6 times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
The 6 times requalification requirement is similar to that found
in a number of other states. However, in developing the legislative changes
the Utah Advisory Council felt that there should be some allowance for those
close cases in which there were mitigating circumstances. They felt that
those cases which under the former law would have resulted in a 2 to 5 week
disqualification should now have no disqualification at all and in those
cases that would have received the 6 week disqualification would now be
denied benefits until the claimant has returned to work and earned at least
6 times his or her weekly benefit amount. It is to this intent that the
new law should be interpreted and it was for this reason that the wording
"equity and good conscience" was written into the law so as to allow benefits in the type of case in which we formerly denied benefits 2 to 5 weeks.
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The application of the new law should not result in any changes
from the way in which these two laws were formerly applied insofar as determining whether or not "good cause" existed in the claimant's actions of
voluntarily leaving work or in the failure to apply for or accept suitable
work. What constitutes "good cause" has been established by most courts in
this country, including the Utah Supreme Court. Therefore, as before, if
a claimant has "good cause, (as defined by the courts) for his actions then
benefits will be allowed. If "good cause" does not exist, then the surrounding circumstances are reviewed. Fonnerly this was done to detennine if the
durati·an of the disqualification should be less than 6 weeks. Now it will
be done to determine if no disqualification should apply. Formerly we
reasoned that although the claimant did not have "good cause" for his actions
the circumstances were such that equity and good conscience would dictate
that a denial of benefits for less than 6 weeks should be assessed. The
same reasoning now applies except that instead of reducing the weeks of
denial, benefits will be allowed.
11

An example of this under the new law would be a case where the
employer and the claimant have a disagreement over working conditions and
the claimant quits without giving the employer a chance to make improvements.
The claimant did not have "good cause" for quitting without giving the employer a reasonable chance to improve the conditions. The employer was in
error for all~wing_such conditions to exist • . for~rly we would reason that
the "surrounding circumstances" of the case would· warrant a denial of benefits, but that the denial should be reduced from the nonnal 6 weeks disqualification. Now we would reason that although ~he claimant did not have
"good cause" for what he did, there was some 11 reasonableness 11 in his actions
because of ~e working conditions and he has evidenced "a genuine, continuing attachment to the labor market, therefore, it would be "contrary to
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 11
11

This policy of interpretation will become effective at the same
time the new law changes become effective. All necessary training and manual
changes will also reflect this policy.

Edgar M. Denny
Administrator

lm
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ADVISORY COLNCIL FOR SUBCOMMITTEE MEETI:JG
DEPARrMENr OF EMPLOYMENT SEOJRITY
174 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
DATE:

October 18, 1978

PLACE:

174 Social Hall Avenue (Administrative Board Room)

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Helen Ure, Oiairperson
Robert E. Halladay
~partmen t

Ed Mayne
Lenice L. Nielsen

of Ernploymen t Security

Edgar M. ~nny
Duane Price

Floyd G. Astin

Needle Trade
Dick 01.nnre
Jack Holton

Noel Lee

Utah Legal Services
Lucy Billings

John Black

01.airperson Ure called the ireeting to order. Ray Walters was excused.
Olmre, Holton, and Lee introduced themselves as employers in the needle
trades and Mrs. Ure welcomed them. Mrs. Ure explained that some study needed to
be made before the Advisory Council met with the Legislature to present their
proposals. Therefore, the Advisozy Subconnnittee was fonood. Their intent is to
tighten up the law in the qualifying area and change it so that it will confonn
more with what other states are doing. Proposed law changes (Attaclurent #1)
were given to them for study. Mr. Halladay stated that there had also been an
audit report by the Legislative Auditors. Mr. Olmore asked if there would be a
savings to employers, and Mr. Halladay remarked that the Legislative Auditors
expressed the fact that it should be about two and one-half million dollars a
year. Mr. ~nny advised them that the process from here will be that the Advisory
Council will consider the proposals made by the Subcornmi ttee. On this basis they
will make reconurendations to the Legislature. Mr. Astin said that the Subcormnittee
would welcoire any support tCMard legislation, and that the Subcornmi ttee would be
available for further ireetings. Mrs. Ure told them that their endorsement in
writing would be appreciated.
~ssrs.

John Black and Lucy Billings from Utah Legal Services were then introduced
to those attending. Lucy Billings stated that she represents low income people
in civil matters. She is quite disappointed with the Utah law in the fraud area
and mentioned how the states of Nevada, Idaho, and M:mtana handle unemployment
insurance. Mr. Nielsen stated that he thought there should be sorre changes. There
may be some changes for Section S(e) (Atta~nt #2) pursuant to Lucy's presentation.
She was asked to submit some recoJml'endations.
The Subcormni ttee then discussed further business. Mrs. Ure asked if the
"Pecent Law Changes" discussed in an interoffice communication addressed to Di rectors,
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wanted to act upon it for their administration of it. The mtion was made by
Mr. Mayne that the "Recent Law 01.anges" be adopted as part of the report to the
staff who will have to interpret it. The nntion was seconded by Mr. Halladay
and passed.
The motion was made by Mr. Halladay that for a mtter of policy the work
week will be detennined by the work period upon which the next work day begins.
This motion was seconded by Ed Mayne and was tmanimously approved.
Mr. Denny stated that as soon as the guidelines on change are established
we will start interpreting them. At the next reeting we will develop a lot of
alternatives and not provisions.. He also stated that he had had a call from the
Governor's office asking for a report of pending legislation and he had infonned
Kent Briggs that the Council was working as instructed. Recomneidations were
given to report to Richard Dunn along with the legislative auditors.
The next Advisory Subcommittee meeting will be held Wednesday, Novenber 1,
1978 in the Executive Board Room.
The reeting was adj oumed at 3: 40 p. m.
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ADVISORY

COUNCIL

for

INDUSTRIAL

COMMISSION

OF

UTAH

January 10, 1979

Honorable Miles "Cap" Ferry
President, Utah State Senate

PUBLIC
A&PAESENTATIVES

Alison Thorne, Ph.D.
Helen a. Ure
RicherdP.Lind•v,Ph.D~

Honorab 1e James V. Hansen
Speaker, Utah House of Representatives
Gentlemen:

EMPLOYER

We write as representatives of the Advisory Council to the
Industrial Conmission of Utah, Department of Employment Security,
which Council as you know was created by the legislature to
represent the interests of industry, labor, and the general
public in matters relating to Employment Security.

REPRESENTATIVES
Robert E. Halladay

0. C. Madsen
Am• I<. Bagley
J. Gordon Sorensen
Winston J. Fii lmore
Rav Walters
Jack A. Olson

EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATIVES
Zelma B. Brundage
Ed Mavna

Lenice L. Nielsen
Richard Schon•
Joe B. Cordova
Max Sidwell

During the last legislative session a bill was introduced
that would have made some changes in the Utah Employment Security
Act without involving the Advisory Council. The bill was withdrawn with the charge given to the Advisory Council to study the
proposed changes and make its reconmendations during this session.
·About this same time the Legislative Auditors completed a study of
the Department of Employment Security.
The attached Senate Bill 78 is the result of nearly a year
of meetings which included the study of the laws of the other
states and the Legislative Auditors' report, open hearings where
spec·ial interest groups could express their concerns and, finally,
a great deal of negotiation primarily between the employer and
employee representatives over what changes to make and the wording
of those changes. Although there may be some other areas of the
law that might need further study this bill deals with the major
concerns expressed and represents a substantial change in the
eligibility provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Industry and labor alone pay the bills and are recipients
of the benefits of these programs. We, therefore, want to maintain
a law that will provide for long-range stability unaffected by the
shifting views of special interest groups. We are well aware of
the costly and destructive labor-management struggles experienced
in other states where Employment Security policies have fluctuated
frequently and widely with short-tenn changes of philosophical
viewpoints. Thus, the Utah Legislature. in its wisdom created
· the Advisory Council which has, over the years, worked well for Utah.
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Honorable Miles "Cap" Ferry
Honorable James V. Hansen ~
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January 10, 1979

Because of this it 1s a widely accepted fact in industry, labor
and government circles that the Utah Employment Security program
and its management are among the best, if not the best, in the
nation. ·
We, therefore, urge your support for the passage of this
negotiated Senate Bill 78 unchanged and, ;f there are other areas
of concern, that the Advisory Council be given the opportunity to
thoroughly study them and report again at the next legislative
session. We would be pleased to meet with you or your conmittees
on any of these matters at your convenience as would any Advisory
Council member or any of the management staff of the Department of
Employment Security.
Sincerely,

~e~

Dr. Alison Thorne
Conmittee Chairperson
Lecturer, College of Family Life
Logan, Utah

Robert E. Ha11aday
ExeCutive Vice President
Utah Manufacturers Association

lm
Attachment
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